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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at the issues of land grabbing and climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Taking the situations of small-scale farmers – the dominant group of people population-wise 
and producers of 90 percent of the subcontinent’s food – as its focus, it also looks at how 
climate change might make land grabbing worse. It is argued that climate change will do so 
because of: decreased agricultural productivity both in land-grabbing countries and in Sub-
Saharan Africa; the rise of the agrofuel industry; because of improving terms-of-trade for 
primary commodities; because of carbon compensation schemes; and because of risk 
diversification in the face of extreme weather events, among other factors. Agrofuels will likely 
play the largest part. 
 
Therefore, the thesis also proposes a new type of climate aid to help small-scale farmers prevent 
land-grabbing. It argues that the chances for the proposed climate aid to become a reality are 
reasonable, foremost because of geopolitical struggles in general and for agricultural land in 
particular, but hopefully also because the international community realizes that helping small-
scale farmers manage these double threats will gain the whole world. However, the aid will 
neither be called ‘climate aid to prevent land grabbing’ or the like, nor will it be disbursed 
through the UNFCCC platform and the Green Climate Fund. This is due both to the proposed 
climate aid’s controversial elements in the eyes of prospective land grabbers and to the current 
lack of climate aid. 
 
Unfortunately, one of the two parts of the thesis suffered from a methodology come undone. 
This had major consequences for the main research effort, namely to learn from small-scale 
farmers, represented to some extent by members of relevant NGOs, about which priorities the 
proposed climate aid should have according to them, if it was to be implemented. Since the 
methodology broke down (a development discussed in the thesis) the thesis in large part is a call 
for further research. 
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ORIGINALITY: The relatively unexplored connection between climate change and land grabbing is 
engaged. The priorities that climate aid should have according to NGO representatives of small-scale 
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KEYWORDS: land grabbing, small-scale farmers, climate change, climate aid, COP 18, NGOs 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background: land grabbing ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Purpose of thesis ................................................................................................................................ 4 
2. Methodology ............................................................................................................................................. 6 
2.1 Research approach ............................................................................................................................ 6 
2.2 A methodology come undone ........................................................................................................... 7 
2.3 Respondents ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.4 Design of questionnaire ................................................................................................................... 11 
2.5 Theory of science ............................................................................................................................. 12 
2.6 Delimitations, needed contextualization, standpoints, and concepts used ................................. 13 
3. Theoretical justification ........................................................................................................................ 16 
3.1 The connection between climate change and land grabbing ....................................................... 16 
3.2 Basic arguments .............................................................................................................................. 18 
3.3 Plausibility in the light of current climate aid .............................................................................. 20 
3.4 Geopolitical aspects ......................................................................................................................... 21 
3.5 Role of small-scale farmers for development ................................................................................ 22 
3.6 Priority suggestions ......................................................................................................................... 23 
3.6.1 Providing incentives for governments to implement favorable programs ................................. 24 
3.6.2 Specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation ............................................................ 25 
3.6.3 Promotion of farming practices and food security strategies .................................................... 26 
4. Results from questionnaire ................................................................................................................... 28 
4.1 Incentivizing governments to implement programs .................................................................... 28 
4.2 Local-scale projects ......................................................................................................................... 30 
4.3 Farming strategy dichotomies ........................................................................................................ 32 
5. Discussion on priorities ......................................................................................................................... 33 
5.1 Ranking of priorities ....................................................................................................................... 33 
5.2 General applicability of priorities .................................................................................................. 33 
6. Concluding remarks .............................................................................................................................. 35 
References 
APPENDIX 1 Questionnaire 
APPENDIX 2 Follow-up interview 
APPENDIX 3. Interview guide 
 
 
 
Figures and tables 
Table 1. Respondent info ............................................................................................................................................... 9 
Map 1. Respondents’ home countries ......................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2. Priority suggestions for spider chart one .................................................................................................... 24 
Table 3. Priority suggestions for spider chart two .................................................................................................... 26 
Table 4. Priority suggestions for dichotomy scales ................................................................................................... 27 
Fig 1a. Spider chart one (average) .............................................................................................................................. 28 
Fig 1b. Spider chart one (all answers) ........................................................................................................................ 29 
Fig 2a. Spider chart two (average) .............................................................................................................................. 30 
Fig 2b. Spider chart two (all answers) ........................................................................................................................ 31 
Fig 3a. Dichotomy scales (average) ............................................................................................................................. 31 
Fig 3b. Dichotomy scales (all answers) ....................................................................................................................... 32 
Map 2. Average annual rainfall in Africa 2003–2007 ............................................................................................... 34 
Map 3. Vegetation zones of Africa .............................................................................................................................. 34 
 
  
 
 
 
1 1 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background: land grabbing  
 
After the food price hike in 2008 and the ensuing food riots in many places around the world, 
many governments harshly realized how their countries might be negatively affected by future 
instabilities or supply shortages on global food markets, driven by increased food demand 
because of population growth and dietary change (eating more, and eating more meat), and by 
urban expansion, irresponsible agricultural practices at home, and, most of all, agrofuels. A 
series of very large land acquisitions in developing countries followed, illustrated in the global 
media by a crop-hungry China buying up or leasing large swathes of land in countries in in Sub-
Saharan Africa, especially Ethiopia – a country regularly suffering from famines. Transnational 
corporations and speculating investors also took part, such as in Madagascar where South 
Korean giant Daewoo signed a deal for a staggering 1.3 million hectares – half the country’s 
arable area – with the government, which as a result was overturned by a massive opposition 
later cancelling the deal. (cf. Daniel 2011). 
 
The concept of land grabbing is commonly understood as large-scale land buy-ups (or long-term 
leases) by investors, both private and public, usually at bargain prices. Investors are can be both 
domestic and foreign (in Sub-Saharan Africa foreign investors are dominating; Hermele 2012: 
188) and in most instances the local population is hardly consulted at all. The concept is very 
controversial. Opponents argue that such agricultural deals are much-needed investments. No 
one remains indifferent to the topic, especially not upon hearing about the low prices paid in 
Sub-Saharan Africa for what is often prime agricultural land (cf. ibid, 188). My view is that 
some large-scale foreign investments in agriculture are needed in developing countries, for 
various reasons – ecological, historic, pragmatic – and that there are well-managed projects. The 
focus of this thesis, however, will be on malign projects. Hence, the definition of land grabbing 
used here precludes relatively benign agricultural land deals1; this thesis looks only at the kind 
of large-scale land deals that are not benefitting the country as a whole, and that is especially 
harmful to small-scale farmers – i.e. land grabs. 
 
What land grabbing really is about is a struggle over land already used in different ways, as well 
as a struggle over decision-making. Even though deals may be illegitimate and corrupt, they are 
not illegal since the land is almost always voluntarily offered by the governments (cf. ibid, 187). 
Land grabbing is a kind of, to paraphrase David Harvey (2003), accumulation by dispossession, 
where the wealth of the public is centralized into the hands of the few – in other countries. The 
process works through privatization of public goods previously used collectively and 
customarily; through financialization of land resources; through state redistributions; and, as is 
implicitly argued throughout the thesis, through a sort of imposed management of a global 
brewing food crisis. 
 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
1 For a discussion on the elusive border between benign large-scale land deals and land grabbing, see for 
example Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen 2010; Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, Keeley 2009; and Daniels 
2011. 
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A list of countries in which land grabbing has occurred include: Angola, Benin, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Senegal, Surinam, Uganda, and the Ukraine. The list of land grabbers is almost as long: 
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Libya, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom2. The biggest transnational 
corporations involved deserve separate mention: oil companies such as Shell and Petrobras, and 
food and agriculture companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Du Pont, Deere, and 
Monsanto. (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012; Berkeley & Osvalde 2012; Hermele 
2012; NAPE 2011; IFPRI 2012; Daniel 2011; Friis & Reenberg 2010). These lists are probably 
understated. The point is that land grabbing is a widespread phenomenon, a true land rush. 
 
Land grabbing evidently happens in more places than Africa, but the phenomenon has been 
most widespread there (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012). Countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are not more corrupt than other countries at the same income level were or are (Sachs 
2005: 188–191, 311–314), but the subcontinent’s low ranking in the current world system 
hierarchy, together with its fertile soils (often viewed as insufficiently used), turns its corruption 
and desperation into efficient matchmakers for investors and government officials. Without 
doubt, the latter group is sometimes only searching for development trajectories, but the result is 
often the opposite. It should be mentioned that there are cases where small-scale farmers are 
consulted prior to deals and actually are the ones selling, more or less by their own free choice. 
There are also examples of where dissidents are given compensation in some form if projects 
are pushed through in spite of their disapproval or if they choose not to take up employment on 
the land afterwards (which is only sometimes offered though: the jobs left after rationalizing are 
often filled with workers brought in by the investor). Such projects would be relatively good 
agricultural investments and as such they are not included in this thesis. However, bad cases of 
course include those where it can be discussed to what degree the promises made to small-scale 
farmers later are honored, and those where hand-to-mouth situations for small-scale farmers are 
exploited by a seemingly large check that in reality hardly represents the value of the transacted 
land. 
 
What is driving land grabbing specifically? The food crisis was a direct wake-up call but also 
indirectly raised worries that food prices would now begin to rise after having stagnated during 
the last two decades. These worries have only grown larger as food prices again rose in 2011 
and 2012. The trends of population growth and rising consumption as the global middle class 
grows in the image of the West are chiming in: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations projects that the global crop production will increase by 55 percent to 2030 and 
by 80 percent to 2050, compared with 1999 to 2001 (FAO 2005). In the eyes of countries 
dependent on food imports and with money to invest, these trends make more of these 
investments necessary. However, making up approximately a quarter of the land investments 
according to one study, food production only comes in second among the factors explaining 
land grabbing. The most important factor is actually agrofuels production, at about 40 percent of 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
2 The list includes both public investments and private investors hailing from the countries implied. It is 
often also the case that investors are public-private joint or mixed ventures or even domestic firms acting 
as fronts for foreign firms; it is a complex mess, making understanding the issues and responding to it 
harder. 
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investments, which is of course highly problematic not least since it often displaces food 
production and thus puts further pressure on other land. Crops for livestock production and 
other non-food crops together make up less than one tenth. Non-farming areas such as forestry 
and carbon sequestration, mineral extraction, industry, and tourism3 together make up the 
remaining quarter. (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012). Of course, as mentioned not 
all investments are made by actors planning to use the areas productively themselves: in some 
cases speculators are simply responding to anticipated land value increases (ibid: 24–28; Daniel 
2011). Just as for foreign actors, the favoured argument for governments putting up land for sale 
is that the deals will lead to development, the whole population included. Both groups of actors 
are also fond of portraying affected land as ‘marginal’ or ‘suboptimally used’ in an attempt to 
undermine the legitimate claims of current users (Hermele 2012: 212). 
 
To understand the social impact of land grabbing, one must first understand their enormity: 
millions and millions of hectares (cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010) The consequences are many and 
harsh. The most overarching is the diminished ability of the developing country government to 
care for its population since big land grabs risk turning into large breaches of sovereignty, as the 
wishes of foreign investors take precedence over the needs of local people. The foremost direct 
consequence is decreased food security for affected countries since the agricultural produce 
almost always is exported. The population may therefore be turned into net food importers or 
become even more import dependent. It is extraordinary that massive agricultural investments 
can end up rendering an area less food secure. In the worst cases, no spillover effects at all may 
be realized development and money from the deals may be embezzled. For small-scale farmers 
the consequences are harsher still: as newly landless people, they often face increased poverty 
and forcible internal displaced or even being turned into refugees, if within-country migration is 
impossible for some reason (cf. Guttal & Monsalve 2011). In extreme events, violent conflicts 
cannot be ruled out, from both sides – e.g. military backing keeping peasants in check and 
peasants assaulting security personnel. Other negative impacts from land grabbing for the 
country as a whole but mainly for people living in proximity to bought/leased land, is 
diminished security of land tenure. Small-scale farmers not affected by land grabbing may still 
suffer from them for yet another reason: increased inequality between them and larger 
landholders as it often is only the latter who have the capacity to adapt to the new situation and 
take advantage of spillover effects of commercial association with the new enterprises 
(Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012: 42). Neighboring small-scale farmers may also be 
indirectly affected by the environmental degradation that follows in the wake of intensive 
industrial farming.  
 
The worst victims of land grabbing are small-scale farmers, not least in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Therefore this thesis is devoted to their cause and will make an effort to let their voices be 
heard. For as bad as the situation is right now, it seems poised to become much worse. In 
Kenneth Hermele’s dissertation Land Matters: Agrofuels, Unequal Exchange, and 
Appropriation of Ecological Space, in which he describes this new “scramble for Africa” as a 
new form of neocolonialism and claims that the world is entering a “new agro-regime”. 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
3 Perhaps most disturbingly of all, for example in Tanzania big game corporations are set to commit 
extraordinary land grabs to secure hunting areas for wealthy foreigners, threatening Maasai dwellings 
(Avaaz 2012; Nelson, Sulle, Lekaita 2012). 
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Hermele is backed by a clear trend showcasing both more hectares grabbed and more 
agricultural investments during recent years (Hermele 2012: 177f, 186f).  
 
Unfortunately, in addition to the above mentioned pressures leading to more land grabbing, at 
least two economic trends might increase the speed of land grabbing even more: the terms-of-
trade for primary commodities have long been deteriorating compared to industrial goods, but 
this pattern might be about to change due to the rise of new industrial giants churning out cheap 
manufactured goods, and since the extractive primary-commodity industry is running up against 
its own limits. These limits present themselves when new locations for extraction (cultivation) 
become harder to come by and transportation costs likely no longer can be lowered as a 
response, at least not on the massive scales that we have seen historically. If this results in 
improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities, it will make land grabbing seem like an 
even better deal for land grabbers since the price of agricultural products will be kept up or 
increase further. (cf. Hermele 2012: 117, 122). Such improving terms-of-trade might of course 
be a blessing for many developing countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. However, 
considering that land grabbing occurs already today more than this will likely be needed in 
order to stop land grabbers fuelled by even larger incentives. The natural resource curse seems 
set to stay in strength in a subcontinent unfortunately still too stuck in the bottom of the world 
system hierarchy to be able to use its resources for a welfare takeoff. 
 
In addition, climate change looms over the horizon and threatens to make land grabbing an even 
more common phenomenon because of decreased agricultural productivity both in land-
grabbing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa, because of the rise of the agrofuel industry, 
because of improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities, because of carbon compensation 
schemes, and because of risk diversification in the face of extreme weather events, among other 
factors4. Small-scale farmers are arguably the most climate-vulnerable people. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the unwilling number one tool to make amends for global North exploitation of 
the South, foreign aid, must be one of the unfortunate paths of last resort also here. That is, 
should climate aid address land grabbing as it increasingly becomes a problem driven by climate 
change? It is an idea that likely will meet strong resistance from powerful countries already 
grabbing land or thinking about doing so in the future – but if climate aid should address this 
issue, we at least have to examine if it could.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose of thesis 
 
Aware of the above complex of land grabbing problems, of how climate change will not make 
the issue easier, of the need to always be able to prioritize, and with the thought-provoking 
climate aid idea fresh in mind, I wondered:  
Is it justified and plausible for climate aid to be disbursed to help small-
scale farmers prevent land grabbing, and if it could, how should it be 
prioritized for small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
4 This argument is central to the thesis and is laid out in detail in subsection 3.2. 
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This thesis aims to discuss the former question in a broad manner and answer the last question 
in a narrow manner, including what the priorities are, how they should be ranked, and how 
context-dependent they are. Importantly, the thesis aims to draw considerably from the opinions 
and insights of small-scale farmers, who are the most fitting to describe their own needs. Since 
the thesis’s angle is quite new, it is written as a normative account with the intention to make an 
attempt, albeit a quite delimited one, at shedding light on a big development issue and to suggest 
a complementary way to tackle the situation.  
 
Having read an account (ILC, CICEPA, CCU 2011) on how Uruguayan small-scale dairy 
farmers were able to resist a wave of land concentrations, enriching a few largeholders to the 
detriment of small-scale farmers, one of the main rationales underlying the thesis is that the 
agricultural productivity of small-scale farmers is their main way to stay competitive enough to 
stand a chance of being able to resist land grabbing. By ‘competitiveness’, not only being able 
to compete well in global food markets is implied; being the one best able to feed itself is also 
included, since a major official rationale for land grabbing is that domestic food production is 
insufficient even to feed the own population.  
 
The geographical dimensions of the thesis are many: displacement of people, changing 
ownership structure of land, local variations in the consequences of climate change and 
responses to them, competitiveness in agricultural productivity to survive predatory land 
markets, global north greenhouse-gas emissions as a weapon for neocolonisation of the global 
south, among others. The thesis aims to address all of these in various ways. As is discussed in 
subsection 2.2 and in section 5, the methodology partially broke down for one of the thesis’s 
two parts. A sub-purpose is therefore to discuss why this happened and what the implications 
are, as well as discussing what was hoped to be accomplished by the unachieved 
methodological approach, so that future research can try to do the same. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
6 6 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Research approach 
 
The purpose of the thesis is operationalized through a two-folded approach. In the first part 
(section 3)5, the case for the proposed climate aid is presented in more detail. The aspects 
examined include basic arguments; the connection between climate change and land grabbing; 
how realistic the proposed climate aid is considering the low volumes of existing climate aid; 
geopolitical potentials; and the role of small-scale farmers for development in general. None is 
explored at depth but all are important in order to provide a more robust justification for the 
proposed climate aid6. Then, priority suggestions (not the finally identified priorities, some are 
later discarded) are proposed. This is interesting in itself but is mainly performed in order to 
make the thesis’s second part manageable: (section 4) the asking of small-scale farmers of what 
they think should be the priorities – we always have to prioritize – for the proposed climate aid 
if it is realized (section 4), and (section 5) a closer discussion of the results, focusing on the 
ranking but also looking at the general applicability of the priorities. For pragmatic reasons the 
priority  suggestions  had  to  be  quite  broad  and  inclusive,  a  problem  hard  to  get  around, 
but they were divided into three groups: providing incentives for governments to implement 
favorable programs, specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation, and promotion of 
farming practices and food security strategies. The two first recommend specific actions while 
the latter is prescribing a more overarching focus for all actions.  
 
Aiming at participation of local people (small-scale farmers) and at generating knowledge from 
them, an approach including Participatory Rural Appraisal, PRA (cf. Chambers 2008, 85–104), 
would have been enlightening and suiting the wish for participation, empowerment, sovereignty, 
demand-driven development, freedom of choice, and sustainability. Unfortunately it had to be 
deemed impossible for the scope of the thesis. Instead the plan became to use a triangulation of 
methods: questionnaires, interviews, and then follow-up interviews after initial analysis. Such 
an approach would diminish the errors generated by the methods on their own and complement 
each other well, thus making the results more trustworthy. Asking small-scale farmers for their 
opinions required finding good representatives for them: relevant, knowledgeable of the issue 
and accessible. The natural answer for the two first criteria was to find Sub-Saharan African 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in affected countries, preferably on the issue 
of land grabbing or together with people directly concerned with it. ‘Knowledgeable’ also 
included knowledge of climate change, aid, and, at its best, the combination of the two. The 
answer to the third criteria, accessibility, was to go to Doha for a week in the beginning of 
December, where last year’s Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the United Nations 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
5 The first part can also be said to consist of subsection 2.6, which consists of discussions not central to 
the thesis but still of relevance, not least in order to put it in its context. 
 
6 Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a more thorough economic and political study of 
whether the proposed aid is a good idea or not, no attempt is made to adopt a method of measurement 
providing means to let this be more scientifically judged. The theoretical justification arrived at is 
therefore somewhat subjective and more of a justice-based case making a moral plea. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held. This permitted time 
efficiency at a task involving talking to people ordinarily spread over a whole subcontinent, 
since members of sought-after NGOs coalesced in Doha. 
  
Concerning the literature, the thesis draws upon a large host of secondary sources. The literature 
used is mainly Western due to its easy accessibility, but this might be problematic for the aim of 
giving voice to the small-scale farmers. Overarching aid theory is provided in large part by two 
aid theory giants, Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly, and their famous respective books, The 
End of Poverty and The White Man’s Burden. The two Americans are in some matters each 
other’s opposites7, but in the areas of most importance to this thesis they are in striking 
agreement: which aid that has worked best and the need for aid to help the extremely poor, 
small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa included, with their desperate needs, with the aim of 
kickstarting sustainable, self-propelled growth (cf. Sachs 2005; cf. Easterly 2006). When it 
comes to the consequences of climate change, the natural choice is the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC). Even though there is more current research, the Fourth Assessment 
Report, from 2007, is used because of its authority. For some aspects, a 2012 follow-up report 
was of direct relevance to the thesis and hence was used instead. Apart from Hermele (2012), a 
few other sources were consulted repeatedly: Guttal & Monsalve (2011), Friis & Reenberg 
(2010), Daniel (2011), Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor (2012), and Crabtree-Condor & 
Casey (2012) – all from 2010 or later, which reflects the youth of the academic field on land 
grabbing (the two latter sources are from NGOs, though). The literature for coming up with 
priority suggestions is only synoptically read. This needs not be problematic, however, since the 
aspects covered are common features in the academic field and since the idea is mainly to 
identify choices for respondents. The remaining comment on the literature is on the lack of it: 
the thesis contains not a small degree of speculative arguments and qualified guesses. The 
reason for this is that the topic of the thesis is relatively unexplored. 
 
 
2.2 A methodology come undone 
 
The grand plan of triangulation soon collapsed. Almost immediately upon arriving in Doha, it 
proved impossible to set up interviews because of the chronically busy schedules during the 
conference and the lack of information on which NGOs were going to attend, making preparing 
beforehand a near impossibility, so this approach had to be abandoned8 in favor of focusing on 
gathering respondents for the questionnaires, a task not easy either. Thankfully, the 
questionnaire did its job well, because a month later, a week before this thesis was due, it was 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
7 The main contentious issues between the two are: foreign aid’s general track record – Sachs more 
positive than Easterly; the areas where aid can do good – Easterly more pessimistic than Sachs; how 
quickly aid should be scaled up – dramatically according to Sachs, in piecemeal according to Easterly; the 
potential range of free markets in the international battle on poverty – Easterly more optimistic than 
Sachs; ‘Planning’ vs. ‘Searching’ – Easterly prefers the market- and entrepreneur-inspired searching 
approach to aid over, allegedly, Sachs’s big government-oriented plans; and, seizing the historic 
opportunity to end poverty vs. irresponsibly standing idly by – according to Sachs the difference between 
him and people like Easterly. 
 
8 The planned interview guide can be seen in Appendix 3. 
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clear that also the third leg had failed. Owing to the loss of the interviews and the difficulties in 
setting up teleconferencing, the follow-up interviews had to be conducted suboptimally over e-
mail in a quite rigid, structured format in order to build upon the results from the questionnaire 
in an organized manner. All questionnaire respondents but one wanted to partake in the follow-
up interviews and they were hence sent somewhat individualized e-mails. Despite several 
reminders, however, only one responded9. Instead of dedicating an own section to the follow-up 
interview, as planned, the further insights provided by the one respondent is incorporated into 
section 5. 
  
In spite of realizing that the thesis lost a promising method and well aware of the big 
shortcomings of basing research solely on questionnaires, there was no other choice but to 
continue with only one leg intact of the three originally intended. Having only one method for 
generating primary data naturally carried with it negative implications for validity and 
reliability; the risk of missing what was really needed increased, and the risk that the 
questionnaires generated data too rough to be useful on its own increased as well. 
 
Regrettably, validity and reliability are not the only issues concerning the sole use of 
questionnaires. Not that they could seriously be called ‘dinosaurs’, as Robert Chambers (2008) 
pointedly refer to the long questionnaires traditionally used in development studies, but some of 
his critique must be leveled also at the questionnaire used in this thesis: for one, it brought with 
it the concepts and categories of an outsider rather than giving the members of the NGOs a real 
chance to express their social realities and understandings thereof. Another weakness is its wide 
scope, which was not helped by another weakness, that of the short time respondents had 
available to put into the questionnaire. None of this needed to be especially problematic when 
complemented by the two other methods, but as it is now these weaknesses become of big 
importance. The questionnaire is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Because of the breakdown of the methodology for the second part, both this methodology 
section and section 3 have received more attention than what otherwise would have been the 
case.  
 
2.3 Respondents 
 
Relying on NGOs of course brings with it its own problems, the main one being how 
representative they really are of the small-scale farmers: there is a big risk that NGOs get 
frustrated by slow progress on issues they care about and therefore try to speed things up by 
speaking or acting in their names of small-scale farmers without an actual mandate to do so, 
creating dependencies and diminishing local initiative (Holmén 2010: viii). In such cases, 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
9 See the structure of the follow-up interview in Appendix 2; perhaps it was too long, and in that case it 
can serve as an example of how not to perform similar tasks. Another possible error source is that the 
follow-up interview was not attached in the e-mails from the start but rather was incorporated into it. The 
rationale was that the trouble of downloading a document, filling it in, and then uploading it would be 
deterring for respondents, but in retrospective that would have been the familiar way to do it. Other 
plausible reasons for not getting any answers in spite of respondents showing much support for the 
research effort in Doha, were bad timing with the holiday season and lack of internet access for long 
periods of time, as expressed by one respondent. 
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representativity is badly wounded. Of course, this is the pessimistic viewpoint: in some ways 
and cases, certain NGOs can almost be considered to be an elected mini-parliaments deciding 
on a limited number of issues and with an electorate consisting almost exclusively of the people 
this thesis is interested in. Another challenge for representativity is the fact that the term ‘NGO’ 
is a complicated, all-inclusive concept engendering many different types of organizations, 
making the sheer number of NGOs almost unmanageable. Thankfully, the filter used by this 
thesis made it a simpler task, but many relevant NGOs were not present in Doha and it is certain 
that some NGOs on location were missed. In addition, a few could not find the time to 
participate. Yet another representativity issue is that in spite of careful choosing, there is a 
possibility that the participating NGOs are not free of vested interests looking beyond the needs 
of small-scale farmers. Neither is it necessarily the case that the NGOs are participatory in their 
own work (ibid: 10), no matter how much we would like them to be. Accordingly, one needs to 
view the results with skeptical eyes – but not too critically: the participants are confidently 
deemed to be of much value to the purposes of the thesis. However, there is one weakness that 
single-handedly diminishes the scope of what can be done with the results of the second part of 
the thesis almost as much as the loss of the interviews and follow-up interviews: in spite of the 
high number of relevant NGOs and the many days on location, and because of participants’ 
chronic shortage of time, the Doha stay only resulted in twelve usable questionnaires (see Table 
1). This very low number is highly problematic, because even though the questionnaire never 
was intended for statistical purposes, when standing on its own it would have been good to be 
able to use it as such. 
 
Table 1. Respondent info 
 
Among the respondents only two respondents were female, reflecting the gender ratio on 
location in Doha but nevertheless problematic for the thesis since half or more of all small-scale 
farmers are women. This is a large weakness. Another big weakness is the anglophone bias; due 
to a language barrier that proved to be insurmountable, only one (Madagascar) of the 17 French-
speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is included in this thesis, as shown in Fig 1. 
 
Geographical representativity turned out to be limited, which reflects both the small number of 
respondents and that four of them were from one country, Kenya. Eastern Africa is 
disproportionately featured while western Africa only is represented by Ghana, and central 
Africa is not represented at all. All respondents are from countries affected by land grabbing, 
but this is far from saying that all countries affected by land grabbing are represented – of the 
countries identified in the likely much-understated list in the introduction, many are missing. In 
addition, two respondents come from countries not currently experiencing land grabbing of the 
type or scale looked at here, South Africa and Zimbabwe – countries that definitely did so in the 
past, though. This of course does not preclude them from participation here; actually, it might 
make them more valuable because of the lessons learned from history. Further defending their 
status here is that their NGO involvements are with organizations working in larger 
geographical areas, comprising countries currently affected by land grabbing. The same goes for 
the respondent from “southern Africa”; he belongs to a similar NGO and therefore took up the 
offer of not divulging his nationality.  
Respondent  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  Nationality  Ghana Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Madagascar South Africa “southern Africa” Sudan Uganda Zimbabwe 
       Gender  M M F M M M M F M M M M 
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Map 1. Respondents’ home countries 
Showing Sub-Saharan Africa, respondent nationalities and francophone countries. 
(Respondent with nationality “Southern Africa” is not shown.) 
 
The respondents’ opinions cannot be guaranteed to be the official stances of their respective 
NGOs. This is not necessarily negative since personal opinions also are valued (and may be less 
controlled by politics) while NGO membership can still be regarded as a sort of quality control. 
In total ten NGOs are represented (three respondents, of two countries, belong to the same 
continent-spanning NGO) and they have as their primary foci indigenous peoples, climate 
justice, biodiversity conservation, and food, agriculture and natural resources. Together with 
their relevant knowledge on the topic at hand as well as their close contacts with small-scale 
farmers, this makes them well-placed to participate in this thesis. Validity is hence secured. 
However, it is to be stressed that reliability is severely hampered by the respondents being so 
few. Unfortunately they cannot with certainty be said to be good proxies for small-scale 
farmers. 
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2.4 Design of questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire, shown in Appendix 110, is of a quite structured design. This may seem 
strange in view of my qualitative research approach, but it was designed before the triangulation 
failed and was envisioned to mostly result in hints to be explicated upon by the other methods. 
In order to avoid interview fatigue it was carefully designed not to exceed one front page and 
one back page in length, and even this is on the verge of being too much; the five minutes 
advertised to potential respondents always turned into ten or fifteen while they were actually 
filling it out, which on the other hand of course speaks well for the quality of the answers.  
 
Since the short introduction on the questionnaire would not have been enough for the 
respondent to overcome their initial resistance towards performing the task asked of them, a 
careful presentation of the issue and the aim of the thesis was given before each interview. Even 
though they were started with a neutral “sales pitch”, these conversations invariably eventually 
revealed some of my personal opinions. In spite of not wanting to color the interviews, I do not 
regard this as a problem, as discussed below, and in most cases respondents themselves were the 
first to utter the phrase ‘land grabbing’. The definition of land grabbing used, precluding benign 
agricultural investments from the research, was stressed repeatedly. My own priority setting was 
not revealed. 
 
Even after the two introductions and the filling out of personal details, initial resistance was still 
likely to be present to some degree in spite of respondents being highly engaged with the issues. 
For this reason the first page of the questionnaire featured an “easier“ multiple-choice question 
intended as warm-up; after having answered this first question, the respondent is more 
committed to the more demanding tasks awaiting: two spider charts, a set of three dichotomy 
scales, a “cool-down” question intended to rid respondents of information not interesting for 
this thesis before the last feature, an open question about what the questionnaire lacked. It also 
provided space for other comments. The principal intention of this open question was to identify 
big priority suggestions that should have been included but that I missed in my synoptic 
reading. 
 
The spider charts and the dichotomy scales were chosen as features both for their immediate 
visual clarity of what is expected. They also provide an element of fun, increasing the likelihood 
of good-quality answers. The largest benefit of the spider charts is that this way of ranking 
everything at once, so to speak, better captures the respondents’ whole ideas of the field, 
including, importantly, potential synergy effects that according to them might exist. Note, 
however, that this brings with it a risk that individual priority suggestions would have received a 
different ranking if they had not been considered individually, i.e. if synergy effects had not been 
considered. 
 
The spider charts and the dichotomy scales loyally follow what is produced in subsection 3.6 
(on priority suggestions), but because of space constraints on the questionnaire and time 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
10 The appendix is also showing my priorities as they stand during the final phase of writing this thesis. 
They are shown since they potentially might be influencing the discussion. 
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constraints for respondents, the explanations for the priority suggestions are somewhat 
fragmentary and more priority suggestions could not be included. This leads to the risk that 
respondents may miss some of what is intended or, even more problematically, the opposite: 
imply only one aspect, or all but one. Disentanglement was supposed to be accomplished in the 
interviews and follow-up interviews. Another problem is that the ranking of some of the priority 
suggestions perhaps could be quite expected when subjecting them to members of NGOs 
dealing with social justice, the environment, and the situation for small-scale farmers. Assuming 
the respondents are as knowledgeable as believed and hence not as likely to let sentiments of 
past bad experiences overly influence their priority settings, this is deemed to be of small 
consequence, however. Also, the results actually turn out reasonably nuanced (for instance the 
answers to the dichotomy scales are not all the way to the left), and, of course, studies of groups 
not spanning entire political or economic spectra can still be of large value.  
 
The biggest weakness of the questionnaire is that quite a few important topics are not covered. 
For example, judging by respondents’ comments, it could have been clearer on technology 
transfer and capacity building (learned through the open question), i.e. having them be 
explicated rather than just being implicitly present in many of the priority suggestions. A 
missing priority suggestion that definitely should have been included in the questionnaire is 
implementation of early warning systems, reducing vulnerability and exposure to extreme 
weather events (cf. Sachs 2005: 283; cf. IPCC 2012: 19). Early warning systems are valuable to 
have on the local scale since there is big scope and need for custom tailoring. An inexcusably 
missed priority suggestion is that gender aspects and female equality are not included in the 
second spider chart. This is a big and honest mistake. 
 
 
2.5 Theory of science 
 
The personal science-theoretical view held by me and reflected in the thesis needs to be 
explicated. The thesis naturally champions an inductive approach since it is trying to bring to 
light new insights on a topic previously not directly explored. Nevertheless there exist certain 
preconceived notions, as always, not least in preparing the questionnaires. Therefore the thesis 
had an abductive leaning, which undoubtedly colors it. However, this may be of minor 
importance considering what is sought for is not so much a theory as an attempt at a ‘wish list’ 
that could be of use at once but chiefly would be built upon by further research. 
 
Studying the complexities of society demands a hermeneutical approach, I believe. This suits 
the thesis’s relatively intensive approach, based on personal opinions of respondents. Not only 
are respondents, as part of social life, meaningfully listened to because of the meanings of 
reality they perceive, they are also interesting as informants due to their positioning in a world 
full of different (but all valid) interpretations of the topic at hand. I advocate an anti-naturalist 
epistemology because of my belief that the complexities of social life, including the topic of this 
thesis, hardly can be captured fully by numbers or shallow empirics. That is not to say that there 
exist multiple realities, for as regards ontology, to some extent in opposition with the above, I 
am drawn to the idea of an independent ‘world out there’ that we can explore objectively, at 
least to the extent that the conclusions we draw from it do more good than bad; that is, I side 
with the realistic ontology over the anti-realistic, bridging the small but existing gap between 
this and anti-naturalism by cherishing the almost always valid objection of critical realism, 
namely that the concept of multiple realities is an utterly unproductive one, trivializing very real 
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social problems (cf. Flowerdew 2005: 20f, 29), This fits this thesis well since multiple realities 
would probably lead to no confidently identified priorities at all. Not-perfect priorities must 
surely be better than no priorities.  
 
Out of this hermeneutical, anti-naturalist, and realist view of the world and upon research comes 
a sort of wide trust in the wisdom of the crowd. Following from this, I believe that the second 
part of the thesis accomplishes a synthesis of different perceptions, a group-correcting way of 
receiving a more informed picture, that still allows for individual insights to surface, somewhat 
like a focus group generating a sum larger than the addition of the individual replies. I am thus 
confident that much warranted knowledge could have been generated if the methodology had 
held. Had my outlook been positivistic (giving less space for individual insights) instead of 
hermeneutic, naturalistic (giving no space for underdetermined theories) instead of anti-
naturalistic, or anti-realistic (in turn giving too much space for individual opinions, providing no 
ground for useful synthesis) instead of leaning towards realism – or all of these at once – the 
methodological approach would have had to be much more extensive for this to be achieved. 
 
My standpoint is that researchers have a very hard time remaining objective to their research, 
both while conducting it and in framing it, as well as in relation to the individuals or groups that 
are part of it. It is my conviction that the researcher always to some extent influences the 
research by manipulating one or more aspects of it. It follows that self-critique and transparency 
is of utmost importance. Therefore, the research for this thesis is clear with where its sympathies 
lie – in text on the questionnaire, in conversation prior to handing over the questionnaire to the 
respondent, on these pages, and in the questionnaire appendix – and the aim is to be open about 
its every reasoning. 
 
 
2.6 Delimitations, needed contextualization, standpoints, and 
concepts used   
 
Time and space constraints as well as the need for focus necessitates many delimitations. The 
thesis only looks at how to protect small-scale farmers from land grabbers aiming to produce 
food crops or crops for agrofuels. However, it does not examine the worst case-scenario, namely 
having domestic or foreign forces seizing control of land through military invasion. Also, 
another plausible scenario is that of speculating land grabbers colluding with local gangsters, 
militias etc. in an effort to “convince” small-scale farmers of selling their land. The thesis does 
not look at this either and the proposed climate aid would do nothing to prevent it, but it would 
of course be good to get as much development as possible in before these two possibilities turn 
into likelihoods. Another delimitation is that the thesis does not consider the plight of 
pastoralists: even though they are the agricultural group most affected by the language of 
‘marginal’ and ‘suboptimally used’ lands, they demand and deserve an approach of their own. 
However, one respondent actually was a pastoralist (though knowledgeable of the situations of 
small-scale farmers as well). 
 
Since factors other than climate change contribute to the land rush, it certainly can be argued 
that regular foreign aid also should be directed towards this issue – and it should. The priority 
suggestions of this thesis overlap much with projects common for regular foreign aid. However, 
there is a bias for priority suggestions that address areas directly being impacted by climate 
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change. Areas of especially much overlap are discarded already here, even though history has 
shown that aid is effective at them: building roads and railroads (Sachs 2005: 289; Easterly 
2006: 321f), electrification of remote rural areas (Sachs 2005, 282f), and health (Sachs 2005: 
226, 237f; Easterly 2006: 116). Since it is seen to be nearly impossible to use aid as a way to 
reduce corruption, the part of land grabbing that has to do with corruption is not addressed even 
though climate change-induced societal disarray may well increase corruption and hence land 
grabbing. Likewise, a lot could be put in place in the international regulatory landscape to 
hamper land grabbing, but this is not examined in this thesis since it is not an aid question. The 
issue is raised shortly as an illustration in subsection 3.1, however. 
 
Regarding aid volumes and types of aid, the thesis does not look at the immediate size of the 
proposed aid or how big a part it would be of total climate aid, comprising also mitigation and 
‘regular’ adaptation. In spite of this being of critical concern to how many priorities should be 
pursued or even to which priority suggestions that meaningfully can be pursued, it could not be 
managed. Neither does it consider the costs of the priority suggestions nor which of them might 
be easiest to raise aid money for. Closely tied to this, the thesis does not consider the number of 
priorities either, except for rejecting obviously unwanted priority suggestions. According to 
Sachs (2005: 255), “one of the weaknesses of development thinking is the relentless drive for a 
magic bullet”. He stresses how success in any area inevitably hinges upon investments across 
the board. Even if he disagrees on the means to get there, Easterly (2006), agrees with this 
insight. It therefore confidently can be stated that the number of priorities pursued is of big 
importance. At the same time as almost-across-the-board acceptance of the priority suggestions 
not rejected of course would be preferable, the amount of money allocated to the proposed 
climate aid would decide much here. 
 
How the proposed climate aid should be realized in practice, i.e. disbursed through the state or 
through NGOs or by donor agencies doing their own projects – the big debate (cf. Easterly 
2006; Sachs 2005; Holmén 2010) – is not examined since it is too big a question (which donor 
agencies that would do the job best is not looked at either). However, this debate is incorporated 
to some degree since the thesis, through the spider charts, looks at both the scenario where 
donors influence governments through conditional aid and the scenario where NGOs or donor 
agencies themselves do local-scale projects (both scenarios could of course also be pursued 
simultaneously). For reasons of personal conviction about its potential if done right, conditional 
aid is included in spite of it being very controversial. Donors doing their own projects in 
recipient countries is not nodded approvingly at since the thesis embraces participation, 
empowerment, sovereignty, demand-driven development, freedom of choice, and sustainability 
as yardsticks for local development. These would not be doomed by dominant foreign presence, 
but well threatened. However, there are pragmatic concerns to take into account, such as that 
local capacities of various kinds may initially be lacking. Here it can be argued that foreign or 
international NGOs could step in, perhaps funded by the proposed climate aid. However, they 
have even lower incentives to create local capacities and to withdraw when opportunity is given 
than donor agencies do. In this context it should be mentioned that drawing from the opinions of 
NGO representatives for small-scale farmers does not necessarily mean that the proposed aid 
should be channelled through such NGOs. 
 
Some concepts used in the thesis need to be clarified. Many prefer ‘climate finance’ to ‘climate 
aid’ since it showcases how it is more about a duty to help than a choice to help. For example, a 
man in Doha exclaiming “I see climate finance not as aid but as an obligation”. This is 
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sympathetic and duly noted, but this thesis uses ‘climate aid’ since it is the more commonly 
used version and also connotes a clearer connection to aid theory and the history of aid giving. 
For the purposes of this thesis, possible reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions from small-
scale farmer is deemed to be insufficient for even making an indent in the feared climate-change 
induced land-grabbing trend, and is therefore not considered. In the following ‘climate aid’ 
therefore does not, as conventionally, include aid for climate mitigation. Lastly, although many 
accounts consider Sudan and South Sudan as belonging to Sub-Saharan Africa, the United 
Nations does not. This thesis will join the former and include the two countries, since they are 
considered to be among the least developed countries (LDCs) (UNOHRLLS 2012). 
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3. Theoretical justification  
 
 
3.1 The connection between climate change and land grabbing 
 
For a long time we have heard warning bells chiming with projections of temperature increases 
larger than those warned of in the IPCC’s 2007 assessment report. Now, even outlets 
traditionally regarded as climate conservative chime in with their own denunciations of the 
status quo: a couple of months age the World Bank released its immediately widely spread Turn 
Down the Heat report, in which it stresses how crucial it is that we avoid the projected 
temperature increase of four degrees Celsius within this century. Adopting even more of new 
climate science, the International Energy Agency has now for over a year warned that current 
policies are steering us towards unfathomable six degrees of warming (IEA 2011). These two 
organizations making such claims is a good reflection of how almost all new climate science 
result in worse predictions: the consequences are going to be harsher than previously expected 
and the speed of change is faster than feared. Climate change also is increasingly understood as 
not being characterized by linear behavior, i.e. a given amount of climate forcing leading to a 
proportional amount of climate change, but rather by radical state shifts occurring after certain 
largely unknown thresholds (tipping points) are passed. At the same time, climate change is not 
a phenomenon of the future but is already happening, evidenced by a record-small Arctic ice 
sheet and highly suggested by the last few years’ extreme weather events. All the while global 
emissions are steadily increasing, with for example China’s emissions predicted to keep rising 
until 2030 (Guardian 2012a). The UN climate negotiations are not doing much to make the 
situation better, either. 
 
For these reasons it is highly likely that the world will se major climate change take place, with 
large consequences. A short and simplified walkthrough of the projections for three of the land 
grabbers active in Africa follows. In China, climate change will probably mean more natural 
water availability, but rising temperatures will also mean counteracting increases in irrigation 
water demand. If the result is decreased or increased water availability for agriculture depends 
on which climate scenario will prevail, but it depends even more on the Chinese socio-economic 
trajectory (with industries in need of large amounts of water). However, the result is that there 
will be insufficient water availability for agriculture in the coming decades. The northern parts 
of the country fare better than the southern. (Wei et al 2010). The IPCC (2007: 297) reports 
potential consequences of a 2-degree increase to be a 5–12 percent decrease in rice production, 
but also that wheat production could increase 7–25 percent. It also notes that China is especially 
susceptible to increasing salinity of groundwater when salt water intrudes into over-exploited 
groundwater aquifers in coastal regions due to sea level rise (ibid: 483). For China it therefore is 
uncertain if climate change will increase the incentives for land grabbing or not, but it seems 
certain that socio-economic development will do so. For India, a 2-degree temperature increase 
could decrease wheat yields by 0.75 tons/hectare, and a 0,5–1,5-degree rise could spell a 5 
percent yield decrease for maize and a decrease in gross per capita water availability by close to 
40 percent until 2050. However, some studies suggest an increase in wheat production. Indian 
coast areas are also highly susceptible to salt water intrusion due to sea level rise. (IPCC 2007: 
280f, 283 297). For Saudi Arabia global warming likely means a decrease in precipitation, 
having a major negative impact on its already small agricultural sector and on its water supplies 
(Alkolibi 2002). In sum, at least for these three land grabbers it seems more likely than not that 
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climate change will provide incentives for continued land grabbing, even though it is hardly 
clear-cut. By comparison, the 2007 (52, 547, 554f) IPCC assessment report projected net gains 
for European agriculture, suggesting that European countries may not become large grabbers of 
land for food production – at least not northern Europe: agriculture in the Mediterranean, the 
south-west Balkans and in the south of European Russia will suffer much more than northern 
parts. 
 
A simplified account of the projections for Sub-Saharan Africa (not at all considering the sub-
continent’s heterogeneity or the different impacts on it) of course is required as well. The 
projected consequences in Sub-Saharan Africa include average declines for yields of rice (up to 
14 percent), wheat (up to 22 percent), and maize (up to 5 percent) until 2050; worsened water 
supply reliability; decreased food availability of about 500 calories (equal to 21 percent) until 
2050; and an increase in the number of malnourished children by over 10 million until 2050 
(making it 53 million in total). (IFPRI 2009). But even if agricultural productivity worsens in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it will not be the end of land grabbing, because the land is still highly 
farmable – in particular with the resources of wealthy investors. Rather, it means that the 
competitiveness of small-scale farmers decreases even more and hence that investors with the 
capacity to cultivate the land for a while longer than the small-scale farmers will want to do 
so.11 Making countries in Sub-Saharan Africa even less able to resist the land grabbers is that 
the economies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are especially vulnerable to climate change 
owing to their poverty and relative lack of human and physical capital, as well as the 
agricultural sector’s large share of GDP, export earnings, and employment opportunities (cf. 
ibid). Increased disease prevalence due to climate change (IPCC 2007: 435) also decreases 
agricultural productivity and hence competitiveness, both directly and through financial strain 
resulting from prevention and treatment costs, taking away money meant for investments.  
 
A development indirectly connected to climate change that without doubt argues in favor of the 
feared connection between climate change and land grabbing is the growth of the agrofuels 
sector. Hermele (2012: 192) claims that “[n]owhere is the conflict over land more pronounced 
than when it comes to assessing the possibility of substituting fossil fuels with land-based 
energy sources”. Perhaps this conflict is driven more by profit motives than climate sensibilities 
(also, the peak oil issue plays a part), but it is definitely legitimated by the threat of climate 
change. The enterprise is not only considerably ecologically harmful, incapable of replacing 
fossil fuels on any relevant scale, and partly responsible for global food price volatility since it 
replaces food production (FAO et al 2011), but the commonly held notion that agrofuels has a 
lower carbon footprint is also highly doubtful. (cf. Hermele 2012). The hard work of cheaply 
growing food crops to turn into agrofuels is often done in developing countries, directly leading 
to land grabs. One party accused for this is the EU, with its 20–20 target of having 20 percent of 
its energy supply come from renewable energies by 2020, causing agrofuel-related land grabs 
around the world, including in Sub-Saharan Africa (ActionAid 2011). Of course, the food 
production displaced needs to be resumed somewhere, putting further pressures on land, likely 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
11 This of course assumes that climate change does not turn out worse than the projections upon which the 
studies base their calculations on. Indeed, if climate change results in the collapse of much of the 
agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, land grabbing of course is not an option (cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010: 
5). However, this will then be of small comfort. Nonetheless, one cannot rule out this possibility, 
especially not in latter parts of the century. 
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leading to more land grabbing. This trend is widely believed to continue (cf. Crabtree–Condor 
& Casey, 2012; cf. Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75; cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010: 5; IRIN 2012). One 
example is in Sierra Leone, where an agrofuel project – actually supported by Swedish foreign 
aid! – led to land grabbing (cf. Sveriges Radio 2012). Another indirect land grabbing 
consequence of climate change is carbon trading – carbon markets created by carbon 
compensation schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol and 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. There have been cases where projects tied to these carbon 
markets have amounted to land grabbing (Hermele 2012: 198ff; Miller 2012; Friis & Reenberg 
2010: 5f; Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012).  
 
Another factor at play is the threat of experiencing extreme weather events affecting agriculture, 
making countries diversify their risk. Related to risk diversification, speculators never quit 
speculating. Betting on various price changes resulting from climate change will probably 
become ever more common in the foreseeable future. (cf. Guttal & Monsalve, 2011: 73). Yet 
another factor is one related to what was discussed in the thesis’s background, that another 
pressure threatening to lead to more land grabbing is the improving terms-of-trade for primary 
commodities. The part of the argument having to do with new locations for extraction rested 
upon transport costs not being able to be lowered further. The current trend is that oil prices 
steadily are moving upwards. Together with the transport sector being a top priority if we are to 
combat climate change efficiently, this of course provides an incentive to make the sector less 
polluting, but even with this taken into account transport costs will likely soar once we start 
addressing climate change seriously. Rising transport costs due to climate change is therefore 
another way that climate change might make land grabbing worse. 
 
A factor of relatively marginal factor not necessarily leading to land grabbing in itself but 
nonetheless putting pressure on land, is that struggles to make agriculture more climate-friendly, 
for example by producing meat and dairy more organically – cattle farming has a large carbon 
footprint (cf. FAO 2006) – unfortunately mean that more land will be needed to produce the 
same amount of food. Lastly, climate change may also lead to domestic land grabbing, or open 
up to foreign grabs, if it makes unstable regions even more resource-scarce, thereby instigating 
violent conflict. 
 
 
3.2 Basic arguments 
 
Clearly, the moral thing to do would be to have climate aid help small-scale farmers prevent 
their own marginalization – with funds additional to those going to climate aid today. The 
essential moral case here is nothing new. The polluter pays principle is commonly invoked in 
discussions on climate change. It simply states the straightforward logic that more damage dealt 
equals more compensation, from those responsible for most emissions to those not responsible. 
This definitely speaks for the proposed climate since future and perhaps even current land 
grabbing seems to constitute more damage from climate change. Another basic moral argument 
for the proposed climate aid is the childhood intuition of how bullying does not constitute fair 
fighting; small-scale farmers need help in their unbalanced fight against rich-country 
governments, influential transnational corporations, and speculators who can afford to play 
these deals by the wind. Here, the word ‘complementary’ has to be emphasized. The proposed 
climate aid is naturally a measure of last resort, to be used only while and when other measures 
are out of reach. That criterion may soon be upon us. Since incentives to forcefully provide for 
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the own population grow ever stronger, we can no longer count on international law, global 
summits, and the hearts of decision-makers – increasingly belonging in the private sector – to 
stand with small-scale farmers. The efforts holding them responsible to do so must never quit, 
but in the meantime, a complementary route is needed. The proposed climate aid is no substitute 
for a more just world order, but it is better than nothing. 
 
Or is it? The debate on whether foreign aid even can do enough good to be justified is far from 
settled and there is not room enough here to recite it. However, Hans Holmén, writing on the aid 
industry in Africa, states:  
 
“As long as this situation [of rich-country protection of their own agricultural sectors, and 
of rich-country unwillingness to deliver on debt cancellation] prevails, it seems rather 
meaningless to provide development aid – and it would be difficult indeed to maintain that 
aid aims at poor-country development. It is, rather, the case that aid is there to mask 
exploitative, neocolonial relations." (Holmén 2010: 229) 
 
This account is sympathetic and if land grabbing is added to the list a near-perfect recipe for 
disaster is in place. But since those practices are unlikely to end in the near future, since the 
proposed climate aid is decidedly anti-neocolonial, and since monitoring of the aid would 
constantly be on the minds of small-scale farmers risking to lose their lands as well as a top 
priority for NGOs fighting for their cause, the proposed climate aid is worth doing 
simultaneously to striving to end these unjust practices. There are many more arguments for the 
case at hand in opposition to Holmen’s reservation. For example, there are compelling, widely 
agreed-upon reasons to believe that simple interventions of the kinds focused upon in this thesis 
have a reasonable likelihood of success. For example, water infrastructure, power generation, 
regulation simplification, and soil management (Easterly 2006: 154–158; Sachs 2005: 282f, 
289), could all help launch countries threatened by land grabbing into self-propelled progress by 
helping them climb the first rung of the ladder of development, to use Sachs’s words (2005). 
Thankfully, then, the proposed climate aid has a large degree of overlap with regular foreign aid 
as well as with regular climate aid. Hence, as a second best donors can disburse part of existing 
– or, preferably, enlarged – aid budgets to the identified priorities for the proposed climate aid.  
 
Another argument for the proposed climate aid is consistency. Since we often speak of caring 
for refugees, the right thing to do would be to put our money where our mouths are and take the 
best approach to achieve what everybody wants: to make sure no refugees are created to begin 
with. An issue often raised in relation to climate change is that of climate refugees – people 
forcibly displaced, either because climate change has made making a living impossible for them 
or because of climate-change induced resource conflicts. Land grabbing thus threatens to create 
even more climate refugees. Even though the concept of climate refugees usually includes 
people internally displaced into urban centers (often slums) as well, many would become 
international refugees (in need of food). As a result, to stop this would be both the right thing to 
do and the wise choice for countries not wanting to receive more refugees. This choice is made 
even more prudent and morally imperative when considering how people displaced by land 
grabbing have been treated by its own government hitherto. For example in the Ethiopian region 
of Gambella, people evicted by land grabs are being installed in government-built villages. 
Under constant threat of violence and under the false lure of promised land, healthcare and 
education, they are wholly uprooted and moved far from their previous lands and villages into 
largely unfertile areas not seldom lacking water and any opportunities to make a living (Human 
Rights Watch 2012). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
20 20 
The arguments that have been presented so far are all more or less taking their starting-point in 
what will happen in the future. However, the countries largely responsible for climate change 
already have much to pay their dues for – including steps seemingly in the right direction. For 
example, by continuing to give large amounts of aid donors are indirectly nodding approvingly 
at land grabs currently taking place in several countries (cf. Human Rights Watch 2012), and 
there is no shortage of criticism towards the World Bank’s encouragement of procedures paving 
the way for more grabs by setting rules amounting to no more than “a checklist to destroy the 
global peasantry responsibly”, according to the UN special rapporteur on the right to food 
(quoted in Hermele 2012, 210). Also, the G8 has adopted guidelines for international land 
investments, but is has been criticized for being too weak and for not consulting recipient 
countries when they were set up. In the UN’s Committee of Food Security, governance of land 
tenure has been subjected to guidelines (mainly for governments) with a rights-based approach, 
including a gender focus. In spite of over 100 signatures from member countries, this is hardly a 
success. Rather, it also deserves the above quote since compliance is voluntary and free, prior, 
and informed consent of poor communities is not required. (cf. Friis & Reenberg, 2010; cf. 
Crabtree-Condor & Casey, 2012). Even though not directly related, the agricultural subsidy 
policies of developed countries also requires some amends-making to be made. Every year these 
are displacing about US$40 billion in net agricultural exports from developing countries and are 
reducing the agricultural incomes of these countries by nearly US$30 billion (IFPRI 2003]. 
Much of this would have befallen Sub-Saharan Africa, allowing the agricultural sector to 
develop.  
 
 
3.3 Plausibility in the light of current climate aid 
 
The connection between climate change and land grabbing may be clear and the case for the 
proposed climate aid unequivocal, but is this at all relevant in practice? Is there any pragmatic 
chance of launching an aid scheme such as the proposed? Despite all rhetoric rich-country 
donors are currently not even accomplishing the long ago agreed-upon target of giving 0.7 
percent of their GNP as aid. This holds true even if climate aid is included, since almost none of 
it is new and additional, as agreed upon in the UN climate negotiations. The current process to 
scale up climate aid is the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It was established at COP 16 in Cancún 
and has since won its independence (developing countries feared it would become part of the 
World Bank), but developed countries are insisting that most of its money – to be scaled up to 
US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 – shall come from the private sector. Public finance should 
merely act as a catalyst. Accusations of turning the GCF into a “greedy corporate fund” 
naturally follow. With the fund almost empty now two years later and a study overview done by 
UNFCC (2012) that actually puts US$100-400 billion as the estimated range of aid that 
developing countries will need per year just for adaptation (a number including mitigation could 
be as much as four to ten times larger), the situation looks bleak. It became even dimmer when 
no new money was put into the GCF during COP 18. The main outcome was an urge to 
continue to give approximately as much as today. Some new pledges came from European 
countries, amounting only to US$ 6 billion in total until 2015, and as could be expected most of 
it is not additional funds. Another opportunity lost in Doha was the concept of loss and damage. 
Since climate aid has not delivered on its promises and obviously looks set to not do it for a 
long time, developing countries have spent the last two years working hard to implement a 
mechanism compensating them for the consequences of climate change. The proposal 
essentially meant that developing countries would be able to take developed countries to court 
and thereby be adjudicated fair compensation. However, developed countries naturally feared 
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this prospect and through hard and bitter negotiations, and some threats, they managed to turn 
loss and damage into just another area for climate aid. Loss and damage thereby marks an 
important official admittance of the historic culpability of developed countries, but it amounts to 
little new and risks facing the same fate as climate aid for adaptation and mitigation. Thereby it 
epitomizes developed countries’ well-developed unwillingness to heed its global 
responsibilities.  
 
The current lack of ambition is a sign not only of developed countries acting recklessly and 
short-sighted, but also of how infected the UNFCCC process has become. For this reason and 
since powerful countries for self-explanatory reasons would view the proposed climate aid as 
highly controversial, it probably has no future in the UN forum. We can therefore quite 
convincingly write off the UNFCCC as the platform for the proposed climate aid. 
 
All of this seems to suggest that the proposed climate aid’s chances are slim to none. Perhaps, 
though, countries are willing to do this kind of work on their own, bilaterally12. Just because the 
UNFCCC is not the right forum for the proposed climate aid, the conclusion that no such 
forums exist may be overly pessimistic. In addition to all the climate aid already being given 
bilaterally, one event at COP 18 hinted at how powerful countries may harbor will to give 
climate aid but not so under the contentious UN umbrella: among the US$ 6 billion pledged for 
climate aid during COP 18, the UK chose to keep its money outside of the GCF. Instead it is 
going to disburse it bilaterally through its own aid agency DFID, with the stated reason of the 
GCF not yet being stable enough. There are various reasons suggesting that countries potentially 
would choose to embrace the proposed climate aid. Countries not prospecting for land grabs 
perhaps would do it out of moral convictions and in an understanding of how development of 
poor countries will benefit the world at large. Countries in the land-grabbing business perhaps 
would do it for the below reasons (where giving aid multilaterally in small groups of powerful 
countries is of course also a possibility). 
 
 
3.4 Geopolitical aspects13  
 
Aid has always been given largely for political reasons. Given all the ways in which climate 
change may further destabilize the international system, there are reasons to suspect that there 
will not be much of a difference with regards to climate aid – but here this harmful and short-
sighted practice may not be as problematic. Foreign aid volumes were at their heights during the 
coldest days of the Cold War when it provided ‘allies’ with assistance in exchange for votes and 
keeping ideologies in check. Likewise, the proposed climate aid could be a part of a strategy to 
prevent a geopolitical competitor from grabbing large chunks of precious land. Both countries 
engaged in land grabbing (or having corporations doing so) and those that are not might find the 
 
                          – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
12 Still, it should be stressed that for self-explanatory reasons the proposed climate aid is never going to 
be called ‘climate aid to prevent land grabbing’ or the like, but rather go under a more traditional name. 
 
13 Having spoken repeatedly of developed countries in the previous subsection, it must be stressed that the 
below account, just as the thesis at large, does not consider them to be equal to land grabbers; as the list of 
land grabbers in the background showed, they are in fact not and probably will not become the prime land 
grabbers (cf. the parts on Europe in subsection 3.1). 
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proposed climate aid to be of strategic importance. Therefore, a country (or a group of 
countries) could plausibly give climate aid bilaterally (or multilaterally) in order to stop another 
country (or group of countries) from grabbing land. This speculative but no less plausible 
development could potentially counter all of the above naysaying arguments. Seeing as how 
food security is the main concern for all governments, it can be expected that the competition 
for agricultural land will broaden from today’s main rivalry between a rich country and the 
destitute inhabitants of a poor country, to a rivalry between rich countries for the agricultural 
land of poor countries. If land grabs result from this, poor countries lose sovereignty and 
colonialism accelerates, but this may not always become the case. Because as in all warfare, 
alliances will be built, quite possibly and hopefully with poor countries being able to take some 
advantage of the situation and negotiate help that is developing their agriculture, protecting 
small-scale farmers and leads to development – in the end helping the entire world. It is 
farfetched to think that all land grabs will be avoided for these geopolitical reasons –  
 
“Power relations being what they are, it is not far-fetched to believe that such a new agro-
regime will lead to an even greater strive by the Centre to appropriate ecological space, thus 
again making conflicts over land-areas and land-based resources the focal point of 
geopolitically driven land struggles.“ (Hermele 2012: 173f) 
 
– but some may. Of course, the big problem with this argument is why powerful countries 
would invest in measures protecting recipients from land grabbers rather than grabbing the land 
for themselves, as every single plot of land grows ever more important. For one, a further 
destabilized world, perhaps without the U.S. as a single strong leader, means rich countries 
might become more dependent on the support of poor countries, buying the latter leverage. 
Something else speaking against these alliances in turn becoming land-grabbing coalitions is 
that land, unlike ideologies and votes, must be physically controlled if it is to remain in the 
hands of outsiders – an immensely difficult task to perform on another continent, surrounded by 
a starving population. However, it is very much up to debate if the intelligence of leaders is 
stronger than populist temptations to more or less forcefully seize some of other people’s land. 
It should also be stressed that even if geopolitical power plays result in the proposed climate aid, 
this would be far from only positive for countries affected by land grabbing, since geopolitical 
schemes often have substantial side effects for those caught in the crossfire. This is illustrated 
by the danger of history repeating itself: too often has foreign aid only gained the donor country 
and too often has it been badly disbursed and dishonestly evaluated. There is a risk that the 
proposed climate aid would not go to small-scale farmers but rather to local elites. Strong 
monitoring from other countries, from locals, and hopefully from the donor country itself should 
counteract this, but besides, if the proposed aid is coming, recipients better be ready for it – both 
in terms of absorptive capacity and in terms of what they wish of it. To turn such aid down may 
not even be an option, crassly speaking. 
 
 
3.5 Role of small-scale farmers for development 
 
What is the wider development rationale of focusing on small-scale farmers – why is this the 
best option for their countries, and for them, in the long run? The proposed climate aid could 
instead aim at intensifying farming, at concentrating domestic land ownership in a sustainable 
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way, or at achieving this from above through comprehensive agricultural reforms launched with 
the help of foreign aid. Three reasons are given as to why this would not be in the best interest 
of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
First, the overarching debate is provided by the choice between development from below and 
other alternative accounts contra classical development approaches. To simplify, the debate is 
about whether development should be bottom-up, with the participation, self-reliance and 
wishes of small-scale farmers and rural communities as the focus, or top-down, industrial, with 
the steering of bureaucrats and elected politicians as the focus. Here it is not necessary to delve 
deeper into the issues; it suffices to say that history shows that the development path suitable for 
a given country hinges upon many factors. (Potter et al 2008; Easterly 2006; Sachs 2005). Of 
large relevance here to Sub-Saharan Africa are five simple statistics: 90 percent of food in Sub-
Saharan Africa is produced by small-scale farmers, around 95 percent of farmers are small-scale 
farmers farming less than five hectares (IFPRI 2001; IAASTD 2009), with the average being 
around half of that. And, crucially, small-scale farmers make out close to 60 percent of all 
working adults (Global Agriculture 2012). Even though all countries have started out in similar 
ways, these numbers show a huge reliance on the farming sector and makes clear the importance 
of the small-scale farmers for all kinds of development. Taken to its extreme, attempting 
development without including small-scale farmers – for example through domestic agricultural 
enterprises likely having some of the same negative effects as foreign land grabbing – risks 
resulting in major instability. Fundamentally, what both land grabbing and domestic 
development initiatives not putting small-scale farmers at its center are doing is to lose out on 
the potential inherent in the knowledgeable and skilled small-scale farmers.  
 
Second, and arguably of most importance, is that the economies of scale characterizing 
agriculture in other parts of the world is more elusive in Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is true 
that industrial monocultures have the highest yields per unit area of a single crop, it is equally 
true that small-scale farmers doing polyculture farming have higher total output per area unit 
(Daniel 2011: 39; Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75). This makes small-scale farmers the wiser 
approach already today and many times wiser if we do see improving terms-of-trade for primary 
commodities.  
 
Third, given the challenges lying ahead and given that large-scale industrialism has always been 
the dominating attempt to transform agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, with little to show for it, 
a reconsidering away from the traditional rationale is needed. Trying to make African 
agriculture into the image of Western farming by imposing every single aspect of it, no matter 
the local ecological or social contexts, has not been especially successful. Rather, the big role 
that the many small-scale farmers can play needs to be encouraged. Small-scale farmers already 
are the literal breadwinners for the sub-continent. Giving them further opportunities to help 
meet global food demand, create employment, reduce poverty, and promote sustainable 
livelihoods, should be widely promoted. (cf. Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012: 63f).  
 
 
3.6 Priority suggestions 
 
Before being able to present questionnaire respondents with an adequate choice of priority 
suggestions from which to rank priorities, a general picture of potentially relevant, efficient, 
effective, and feasible interventions has to be painted. It turns out that climate aid lot could do a 
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lot. As mentioned, priority suggestions are divided into three groups: Providing incentives for 
governments to implement programs favorable for small-scale farmers, Specific local-scale 
projects for agricultural adaptation, and Promotion of farming practices and food security 
strategies. The last group consists of three dichotomies and is representing a more overarching 
choice of focus for all actions. The first two recommend specific actions and come with inherent 
preferred disbursement methods: channeling aid through government or NGOs, or not at all – 
donor agencies doing projects directly themselves.  
 
Keep in mind that the priority suggestions are results of synoptic reading, that they are quite 
general, and that they consciously have been kept short. None of this matters much, though, 
since the real work befalls the respondents.  
 
 
3.6.1 Providing incentives for governments to implement favorable programs 
 
Table 2 lists priority suggestions that have a focus on incentivizing governments through 
conditional aid, but they could of course also be applied to large NGOs doing work in many 
areas. The headings correspond fairly well with those in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 2. Priority suggestions for spider chart one 
a) Push for programs 
developing drought- and 
flood-resistant crops 
The IPCC (2012: 7f, 18f, 175ff, 235) expresses fears that both droughts and flood will 
become worse for Sub-Saharan Africa. This increases the need for developing drought- 
and flood-resistant crops, low-regret options that reduce exposure and vulnerability. (Here 
no differentiation is made between traditional plant breeding and genetic modification, 
which is featured in in Table 3.) 
b) Push for programs 
preparing rural 
communities and 
infrastructure for 
weather disasters such as 
floods, storms, and heat 
waves (droughts) 
The consequences for small-scale farmers if weather disasters increase will be major. 
Since 1980, climate change-related weather disasters have caused approximately 1.3 
million deaths, of which two-thirds befell the least developed countries, of which almost 
three-quarters of countries are from Sub-Saharan Africa (Guardian 2012b). The many 
floods across Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (WFP 2007) warn of the potential scales of 
damage, not to mention the frequent droughts in the Horn of Africa and that Africa will 
see the largest percentage increase in physical exposure to tropical storms (ibid: 241). 
Preparing rural communities and infrastructure therefore is crucial. 
c) Push for subsidy 
programs for private-
sector loans to small-
scale farmers and for 
other needs of theirs 
Small-scale farmers often have trouble gaining access to loans, and if they do the interest 
rates are usually high. State subsidies, especially to microfinance institutions, could 
improve the situation, just as they can with regards to inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides 
and seeds. In the end, microcredit schemes may not have resulted in the hailed super-boon 
for rural people, but state subsidies could keep also those interest rates down and increase 
geographic coverage. (Morduch 1999). The subsidies would need to be long-term and 
predictable (Armendáriz et al 2011). 
d) Push for land reform 
programs, including 
predictability regarding 
the tenure rights of 
small-scale farmers 
 
The majority of small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have secure access to 
their land, deterring investments and making land grabs easier. Land reforms aiming to 
give small-scale farmers property rights (or making sure that the law recognizes 
commonly held land as private property) are therefore integral both to bolstering the 
agricultural sector’s competitiveness and to protect it. (Daniel, 2011: 32f; IFPRI 2012: 40–
43; Sachs 2005: 321). However, it should not be done as the World Bank has done, 
enabling large-scale investments to easier be made (Hermele 2012: 212 –214). 
e) Push for programs 
enhancing water rights 
and water quality for 
Not only is water supply and quality a precondition for agricultural productivity, it is also 
a major rationale behind land grabbing. This is both an issue water for crops and of 
wanting the water in itself, in fact the main motivator behind many deals (Oakland 
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small-scale farmers Institute 2011). Small-scale farmers need to be guarded for example from their water 
resources being portrayed as unused. Water demand management and improved irrigation 
efficiency measures are much-needed (cf. Sachs 2005: 282f; cf. IPCC 2012: 19). In terms 
of quality, groundwater salinization is vital to avoid, which can be done by moving 
drinking water and irrigation wells away from coasts. 
f) Push for programs 
implementing beneficial 
land-use change 
Small-scale farmers could use help to gain access to knowledge, capital and inputs needed 
to change the way the land is cultivated and increase yields, for example through crop 
diversification. Other examples are conservation tillage in order to reduce input needs and 
fight soil degradation and erosion, and changing dates for sowing, irrigation, and 
harvesting. (cf. Mertz et al 2008; cf. Ochieng Adimo et al 2011; cf. Pretty (2008). 
Agroforestry, for example with nitrogen-fixing trees, is another option (Sachs 2005: 229). 
g) Push for programs 
retaining, spreading and 
making use of the 
traditional agricultural 
knowledge of rural 
communities 
Related to the above but not entirely overlapping is that the diversified cropping practices 
of traditional agricultural knowledge may be lost if current farming practices continue 
(Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75f; cf. Ochieng Adimo et al 2011). Organic fertilizers and 
(crop combination) pesticides are examples of knowledge that the proposed climate aid 
could incentivize the conservation of. 
h) Push for programs for 
livelihood diversification 
If climate change decreases agricultural productivity, small-scale farmers could pursue 
secondary income possibilities in order to increase their ability to stay by their land. The 
proposed climate aid conceivably could do this through increasing the mobility of small-
scale farmers, for example by providing transportation possibilities. (cf. Mertz et al 2008). 
Another, more concrete, example is to help small-scale farmers mill and pack their own 
produce instead of having to sell to agents. 
i) Push for programs 
stressing gender 
considerations and 
participation of women  
Securing women’s land rights is crucial to the agricultural competitiveness of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Crabtree–Condor & Casey, 2012: 9ff), not least since women farmers invest more 
of their incomes into the farm. Women are responsible for around 70 percent of food 
production in Africa (Canadian Food Security Policy Group 2007) but could and want to 
do more. 
j) Push recipient 
governments to 
implement regulations 
protecting small-scale 
farmers and requiring 
consultation with them 
prior to land deals 
Respecting the rights of small-scale farmers and making it a requirement that they are 
consulted and effectively listened to prior to deals would be a great stride forward 
(Crabtree–Condor & Casey, 2012). The democratic principles of free, prior and informed 
consent, and effective, efficient and free participation in decision-making should be 
heeded. If deals are struck, local employment should be made a requirement. (cf. Friis & 
Reenberg, 2010). 
 
 
3.6.2 Specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation 
 
The priority suggestions listed in Table 3 would be carried out by NGOs or by donor agencies 
themselves. They will probably work better if small-scale farmers are participating. The same 
on-the-ground functions could conceivably be performed by domestic semi-autonomous or fully 
government-operated organizations and agencies, in addition to NGOs, depending on the state 
apparatus in question, the local people’s confidence in the government etc. However, this is not 
considered in more detail since the thesis is aiming at as much local participation as possible. It 
is carefully included into the NGO umbrella, though. Where cells in Table 3 refers to Table 2, 
remember that the local-scale scenario amounts more to actually doing work on the ground. The 
priority suggestions’ headings and order differ somewhat between the spider charts (and tables) 
in order to have respondents think about the second spider chart more than to just apply the 
same ranking in the same general area of the spider chart as in the first. 
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Table 3. Priority suggestions for spider chart two 
Projects distributing and educating 
about genetically engineered crops 
Genetically modified crops are argued to be able to both improve yields and to 
protect harvests from harsher weather conditions due to climate change. At the 
same time they are widely controversial. Official investments, possibly through aid, 
would be especially important here since private businesses face low incentives to 
meet the specific challenges for small-scale farmers (cf. Sachs 2005: 282f). 
Projects aiming to implement 
beneficial land-use change 
See Table 2 f) 
Projects supplying chemical 
fertilizers and chemical pesticides 
Many argue that the way forward for agriculture in Sub-Saharan African is a “New 
Green Revolution”, using modern technology to bolster agriculture in a way 
mimicking the previous green revolution in Asia, The foremost representative of 
this movement is AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa; 
www.agra.org), which especially promotes the use of chemical fertilizers and 
chemical pesticides. 
Projects working to retain, spread 
and make use of the traditional 
agricultural knowledge of rural 
communities  
See Table 2 g) 
Projects concerning water supply 
and irrigation 
See Table 2 e)  
 
Projects to protect communities 
and infrastructure from weather 
disasters such as floods, storms, 
and heat waves (droughts) 
See Table 2 b) 
Projects to help accomplish 
livelihood diversification, i.e. 
secondary income possibilities 
See Table 2 h) 
Projects to empower small-scale 
farmers in terms of rights, land 
titles, and decision-making 
See Table 2 d). However, on the ground it would for example amount to educating 
about legal rights and helping with land registration procedures (cf. Daniel, 2011: 
34). This approach is important since it has been widely established that it is not 
possible to fully institute and enforce property rights from the top down (Easterly, 
2006: 79). 
Projects to help creditors and 
microcredit schemes to serve small-
scale farmers 
See Table 2 c). On the ground this can be done by educating small-scale farmers 
about their possibilities and by providing links between creditors and villages, for 
example. 
 
 
 
3.6.3 Promotion of farming practices and food security strategies  
 
The priority suggestions listed in Table 4 represent more overarching priorities for the 
agricultural sector as a whole. Of course, they are not clear-cut dichotomies in reality (hence the 
scales in the questionnaire). 
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Table 4. Priority suggestions for dichotomy scales 
Farming practice/food security strategy vs Farming practice/food security strategy 
Subsistence farming 
Many small-scale farmers in Africa only grow subsistence 
crops. Perhaps, therefore, the proposed climate aid should 
not try to transform them into market actors. Perhaps it 
should also help cash-crop farmers convert to subsistence 
crops, thus being able to feed themselves and rid 
themselves of dependences on the unjust global market. 
Crudely speaking, ‘bottom-up development’ and 
‘alternative development’ theorists are of the conviction 
that such self-reliance is needed for development, 
eventually ending up in a few farmers feeding a whole 
country and even exporting food (cf. Potter et al 2008). 
(Prioritizing subsistence farming of course does not 
necessarily amount to the radical parts of these ideologies, 
however.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vs 
Cash-crop farming 
Many argue that denouncing world markets as a way to 
development. Pointing at the bad experiences from attempts 
at Import Substitution Industrialization, commentators 
argue that turning from globalization is among the worst 
mistakes possible. If countries instead stay open to the 
strongest development tool, truly free markets (Easterly 
2006; Sachs 2005), the welfare for small-scale farmers will 
be the largest, is the argument. Competitiveness follows. In 
any case, global markets are here to stay so it is better to be 
a strong part of it than to try to stand outside of it. Also, a 
side effect of casting away globalization may be to  alienate 
oneself from further aid. 
Low-technology, traditional-knowledge farming 
Intercropping, crop rotation, livestock incorporation, 
organic fertilizers and crop combination “pesticides”, 
among many other practices. What Pretty (2008) identifies 
as sustainable agriculture, able to fix the paradox of 
humanity achieving major agricultural progress but still 
seeing millions going hungry: to integrate biological and 
ecological processes, to minimize the use of non-renewable 
inputs, to use traditional knowledge, and to cooperate to 
solve agricultural and natural resource problems. (ibid: 
166). The benefits are self-explanatory. 
 
 
 
 
 
vs 
High-technology, capital-intensive, high-input farming 
High usage of technologies for intensive agriculture, such 
as machinery, chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides. 
In order to increase agricultural output, a Western mode of 
agriculture should be pursued. Genetically modified crop 
are a self-evident choice and other inputs can be tailored 
after them. The rationale is a renewed version of what the 
international financial institutions have championing for 
many years, with the new aspect being the focus on the 
 small-scale farmer. (cf. Daniel 2011: 37ff). 
Polyculture farming 
As shown in sub-section 3.5, small-scale farmers fare well 
in terms of food output par area unit – even better than 
industrial monocultures, meaning that for small-scale 
farmers to turn to monocultures bears with it large 
consequences. Also, a strong case can be made for the 
environmental advantages of polyculture farming over 
monoculture farming. Especially relevant here is that the 
need for industrial inputs decreases. (Guttal & Monsalve 
2011: 75). 
 
 
 
 
vs 
Monoculture farming 
Food output per area unit is of smaller importance than 
being able to grow as much of the crop with the highest 
returns as possible. Monoculture farming is the start on the 
route towards a large-scale agricultural sector where a few 
farmers provide for the rest of a productive economy. Some 
amounts of environmental degradation has always been 
 inherent in the first steps of development. 
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4. Results from questionnaire 
 
To start with, on the question regarding if land grabbing is going to become more common with 
climate change (cf. Appendix 3), three respondents put down that climate change ‘probably’ 
will increase land grabbing and nine responded ‘definitely’. This agreeing upon the issue at 
hand suggests that the respondents took the questionnaire seriously. 
 
 
4.1 Incentivizing governments to implement programs  
 
Fig 1a and Fig 1b feature the results from the spider-chart question on which priorities the 
proposed climate aid should have if it is used to incentivize governments to implement 
programs beneficial to small-scale farmers. Fig 1a shows the average priority setting while Fig 
1b shows all priority settings. 
 
Fig 1a. The first spider chart (average) 
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The priority suggestions were all received favorably. Considering this and the low number of 
respondents, it is impossible to discard any priority suggestion. It is difficult to say with 
confidence which priority suggestions are more favored than others. There seems to be three 
groups though, where drought- and flood-resistant crops, disaster preparedness, land reform and 
regulations make out the top one. Of the remaining six, traditional knowledge, water and gender 
considerations make out the group coming in second. This provides suggestive evidence for 
further research.  
 
 
 
Fig 1b. The first spider chart  (all answers) 
Each color corresponds to one respondent. 
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4.2 Local-scale projects  
 
 Fig 2a and Fig 2b feature the results from the spider-chart question on which priorities the 
proposed climate aid should have if it is used to support local-scale projects beneficial to small-
scale farmers. Fig 2a shows the average priority setting while Fig 2b shows all priority settings. 
. 
 
 
Most priority suggestions were received quite favorably. Among these priority suggestions it is 
very difficult to confidently discern a useful ranking. The suggestive evidence here is that 
empowerment projects and drought and flood protection are the two top priorities, but again 
there are too few respondents for this to be truly meaningful. What is clear is that genetically 
engineered crops and chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides were unfavorably received; in 
fact, so much so that they (without further analysis) seem to be outliers and hence probably can 
be confidently discarded, i.e. considered not to be priorities at all.  
Fig 2a. The second spider chart (average)  
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Fig 2b. The second spider chart (all answers) 
Each color corresponds to one respondent. 
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4.3 Farming strategy dichotomies 
 
Fig 3a and 3b show the results from the dichotomy-scales questions on which overarching 
farming practices the proposed climate aid should promote. Fig 3a shows the average priority 
settings while 3b shows all priority settings. 
 
The averages are quite straightforward, in fact too much so: the seemingly simple marks come 
with big uncertainties due to the low number of respondents. But they still do provide some 
suggestive evidence. 
 
Fig 3b. The dichotomy scales (all answers) 
Each color corresponds to one respondent. 
Fig 3a. The dichotomy scales (average) 
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5. Discussion on priorities 
 
 
5.1 Ranking of priorities 
 
Owing to the low number of respondents and the collapsed methodology, there is little possible 
to do with the results from the questionnaire. Concerning the spider charts, it should be noted 
that respondents might have interpreted the ranking numbers differently, which results in the 
variations for individual priority settings probably being either somewhat smaller or somewhat 
bigger. Actually, this weakness may influence the averages as well, making the ranking even less 
trustworthy. Had there been more respondents some statistical exercises could have been 
performed to work around this, for example by looking at the relative rankings, i.e. if a ranked 
priority suggestion is consistently being ranked higher or lower than another one across all 
priority settings. Such an analysis on this material for example shows that if any, livelihood 
diversification would be the priority suggestion to be discarded in the first spider chart, since it 
has an average share of the rank sum for each priority setting that is lower than that of subsidies 
and access to loans (this can be seen in Fig 1 but is easier calculated with the raw data). On a 
larger data set similar analyses, of course also incorporating tests of significance with confidence 
intervals etc., could determine rankings more exactly. 
 
Insofar as we can trust the dichotomy scales, their results are quite expected. This may deter 
digging deeper, but it should not. Since the dichotomy scales do not suffer from the same 
interpretation confusion concerning ranking as the spider charts do, for example the variations in 
the respondents’ answers may be quickly analyzed. In so doing we see, among other things, that 
in addition to being the one best balanced, the subsistence farming–cash-crop farming dichotomy 
scale also exhibits the greatest variation, suggesting perhaps that this is an issue where especially 
much further research is needed since respondents are especially unsure there – or simply 
resulting from the fact that the agricultural sectors of respondents’ countries differ in needs more 
in this respect than in the other two.  
 
Since statistical methods cannot be used to make up for the lost interviews and follow-up 
interviews, perhaps a return to the literature could. A framework for analysis could be developed 
for example, perhaps mainly drawing from the combined wisdom of Sachs and Easterly. A 
longer literature study could of course be done too, trying to evaluate the priority suggestions by 
looking at which interventions have proven to be most viable. However, this strays from the 
purpose of the thesis of learning from representatives of small-scale farmers, and is therefore not 
pursued.  
 
 
5.2 General applicability of priorities  
 
Even if the rankings had been more clear-cut there still would have been a need to evaluate the 
general applicability of the findings, since Sub-Saharan Africa is a very heterogeneous 
subcontinent. One method to do so that would have been possible with more respondents 
(preferably also having better geographical representativity) is for example to search for patterns 
by comparing respondents’ answers with their geographies of expertise, their home countries’ 
projected climate change, and their income levels. Many other parameters could be included as 
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well. None of this is done here, because it suffices to look at climate forecast maps to realize 
that the different contexts will wreak havoc with the rankings. But climate forecasts come with 
notorious uncertainties, making choosing one individual map scientifically meaningless and 
choosing a synthesis map too unclear for our illustrative purposes. It then suffices to exemplify 
with current rainfall, Map 2, and the vegetation zones of Africa, Map 3, to get an idea of how 
general applicability might be limited.  
Map 2. Average annual rainfall in Africa 2003–2007 
Note that the borders of South Sudan are not included in map 
Source: UNEP 2010 (borders of respondents’ countries by author) 
 
Map 3. Vegetation zones of Africa 
Note that the borders of South Sudan are not included in map 
Source: UNEP 2010 (borders of respondents’ countries by author) 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
Pertaining to the thesis’s first part, the case for the proposed climate aid is deemed to be strong 
enough for it to be both justified and plausible. Justifying factors are mainly those indirectly 
connected to climate change that likely will make land grabbing worse, driven primarily by the 
rise of the agrofuel industry. These factors are believed to be of larger importance than the 
negative effects on agriculture both in land-grabbing countries and in in Sub-Saharan Africa; the 
messages seem to be strengthen the case but they are too mixed to be certain. There are many 
arguments speaking for the proposed climate aid’s plausibility, foremost among them the 
geopolitical aspects (the aid will most likely be given bi- or multilaterally rather than under the 
auspices of the UN) and the cold fact that the small-scale farmers are so vulnerable to climate 
change that development without this kind of aid will be highly difficult to accomplish and will 
come with bad implications for the world as a whole. Hopefully, moral convictions can also add 
momentum. Of the arguments speaking against the proposed climate aid’s chances to be 
realized, the most important are the current lack of climate aid funding and the traditional 
unwillingness of donors to prioritize development led by small-scale farmers.  
 
The second part of the thesis is something of a failure, because of the capsized methodology and 
the lack of enough respondents to do an honest attempt to make up for this. In short, for having 
the proposed climate aid incentivize governments to implement programs beneficial for small-
scale farmers, the highest ranked priorities are drought- and flood-resistant crops, disaster 
preparedness, land reform and regulations For having the proposed climate aid support local-
scale projects, the top-ranked priorities would be empowerment projects and drought and flood 
protection. The suggestive evidence also almost strikes a balance when it comes to if the 
proposed climate aid should promote subsistence farming or cash-crop farming, while it seems 
to be in favor of low-technology agriculture over high-technology agriculture, and even more in 
favour of polyculture farming over monoculture farming. However, under no circumstances can 
these results be taken at face value or be trusted as more than hints at what further research may 
uncover (not even the seemingly apparent drought- and flood-adaptation). Extra caution applies 
to the questions in the spider charts, where the only aspect remotely close to being considered 
worthy of exhibition is that, as expected, small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa, represented 
at least to some degree by the respondents, do not want genetically engineered crops. The same 
goes for chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides.  
 
Even if the second part came out wanting, it can be of some value through showing how much 
factors integral to a methodology but largely beyond the researcher’s control (compounded by a 
big measure of naivety and over-ambition in the methodology) can decrease the possibilities to 
analyse generated data. For what it is, the thesis is positioned well to be part of the start of an 
important area of scrutiny and action. In laying out the case for the proposed climate aid it 
contributes to framing the issue of land grabbing in a new and, I believe, useful way. Also, the 
thesis consistently points the way to further research, which for example could: 
 
• remake and refine the study but with the whole methodology and more respondents 
• look at the number of priorities to be focused on for various budgets 
• examine the priority suggestions individually rather than as a package, disregarding 
synergy effects 
• do a more thorough economic and political study of whether the proposed aid is a good 
idea or not, including a specifically designed methodology 
• Investigate which of the two aid disbursement scenarios that would fit the proposed 
climate aid best 
• Try to find out how to best make use of the overlap with regular foreign aid and regular 
climate aid 
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(including my own subjective priorities) APPENDIX 1 Questionnaire   
Introduction 
It can be argued that climate change will make land grabbing – large purchases or leases of agricultural land by 
private companies or foreign or domestic governments – more common because of biofuel cultivation and 
decreasing agricultural productivity in countries that can afford to make land acquisitions. Some commentators 
consider land grabbing to be beneficial for the host country as much-needed agricultural investment. Others see the 
risk of local communities and small-scale farmers not being considered in the deals and therefore becoming doubly 
adversely affected by climate change when they also face growing incentives to sell land with declining productivity. 
Forced displacement of people when land rights are not codified or respected is another often-seen consequence 
of land grabbing. 
This questionnaire is part of an undergraduate-level thesis aiming to identify what priorities relevant non-
governmental organizations would like climate adaptation aid to have if it is to be used to prevent land grabbing 
negatively affecting small-scale farmers. The portion of climate aid that would go to this issue is unspecified in the 
thesis but the need for adaptation aid is considered to be large. The voices of NGOs are wanted because they are, 
in the scope of this thesis, considered as representatives for the climate-vulnerable small-scale farmers. Therefore, 
your participation would be much appreciated. The data will not be used for advanced statistical analysis. The aim 
is to identify preliminary priorities, which can then be zoomed in upon for further qualitative analysis. 
 
Name: _________________________ NGO/CSO affiliation: _________________________ 
Optional. Will not be published.      Your organization. Optional. Will not be published. 
 
Nationality: ______________________ E-mail address: _____________________________ 
And/or country of NGO/CSO work. Optional. Optional. For distribution of the final study 
 
Do you think land grabbing will become more common as a result of climate change? 
Please indicate to which degree you think this will be the case.  
☐ No          ☐ Probably not           ☐ Conceivably           ☐ Yes, probably           ☐ Yes, definitely 
 
What should be the PRIORITIES that climate aid donors push for in terms of programs favorable for 
small-scale farmers in the light of potential land grabbing? Please indicate how important the aspects are in 
relation to each other by drawing lines as in the example to the right.  
 
 
 
Development of 
drought- and 
flood-resistant 
crops 
Disaster 
preparedness: 
floods, storms, 
heat waves 
Subsidies and 
access to cheap 
loans: any kind of 
subsidy. Loans 
include microcredit 
Water rights 
and water 
quality 
Land reform: introduce land 
titles to people who 
customarily has cultivated the 
land, ensure predictability 
regarding tenure rights 
Programs for retaining traditional 
knowledge: diversified cropping 
practices, agroforestry, organic 
fertilizers and (crop combination) 
“pesticides”   
Programs for livelihood 
diversification: secondary 
income possibilities, 
mobility (including 
transportation 
possibilities) 
Gender 
considerations: 
securing 
women’s land 
rights 
Push recipient governments to 
implement regulations concerning 
consultation with local 
communities, protection of their 
rights, and, if deals are stuck, 
ensuring local employment 
opportunities 
Programs for land-use 
change: crop 
diversification, zero 
tillage, fight soil 
degradation and 
erosion 
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Promote polyculture farming 
Which farming practices and food security strategies should be promoted by aid agencies, do you 
think? Please indicate, anywhere on the respective lines, what your preferred balance is. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
The above “pushes” and promotions should be realized in practice through… 
☐ …conditions that must be required by the recipient government for the aid to be given 
☐ …establishing research facilities (in the country receiving the aid) that look into these issues 
☐ …donors supporting NGOs and opinion makers striving to influence government policy  
 
What is missing? 
Please comment if you consider something important to be missing in this questionnaire. Also feel free to clarify 
something if needed or to suggest people or organizations you think might be good for me to talk to. 
Follow-up interview 
When all questionnaires have been analyzed and COP 18 is over I might like to conduct short follow-up interviews over e-
mail or Skype. Would you consider taking part? 
☐ Yes, I would consider taking part              ☐ No, I would rather not take part 
Promote subsistence farming Promote cash-crop farming 
Promote low-technology, traditional  
knowledge  (intercropping, crop rotation, 
livestock incorporation, organic fertilizers  
and crop combination “pesticides”) farming  
 
Promote high technology, 
capital-intensive, industrial 
inputs (chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides), high-input farming  
 
Promote monoculture farming 
What should be the 
PRIORITIES for climate 
aid donors’ local-scale 
projects with the aim of 
benefitting small-scale 
farmers in the light of 
potential land grabbing?  
Drought and 
flood protection 
Water projects: freshwater depletion, irrigation, 
avoiding salinization and erosion 
Retaining traditional knowledge: 
diversified cropping practices, 
agroforestry, organic fertilizers and 
(crop combination) “pesticides” 
Supplying chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides 
Land-use change: crop 
diversification, providing seeds, zero 
tillage, avoiding soil degradation and 
erosion 
Providing genetically 
engineered crops Helping creditors and microcredit schemes 
serve small-scale 
farmers 
Empowerment projects: 
create mechanisms 
protecting local rights, 
interests, and welfare, 
helping with land 
registration/titles procedures  
Livelihood diversification projects: 
secondary income possibilities, 
mobility (including transportation 
possibilities) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING! 
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12 questions, approximately 20 minutes APPENDIX 2 Follow-up interview   
 
Here are the results from the first spider chart (your own priorities setting and the average one from 
all 12 respondents). 4 related questions follow below. 
Question 1 
Note in the average how the different priorities have been the average spider chart are relatively 
evenly spread. This makes it hard to choose the number of priorities. Regarding political (donor-side 
and recipient-side) and economic realities (donor-side), how many priorities would be your 
suggestion and why? 
Answer: 
Question 2 
Your own priorities setting differs somewhat from the average one. Are there any results in the 
average spider chart that you object to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general 
or due to your specific geographical or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way). 
Answer: 
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Question 3 
Having seen the average spider chart and chosen the number of priorities, would you rank these 
priorities in 
–   the same way as in the average spider chart, 
– in the same way as you ranked them originally (if you gave suggestions the same rank, please  
try to rank these as well), 
– or in some other way (if so, please elaborate)? 
Answer: 
  
  
Question 4 
Of your now chosen priorities for climate finance programs if aimed at benefitting small-scale farmers 
facing potential land grabbing due to climate change, are there any aspects that are more important 
than others, that are missing, or that should be left out? 
Answer: 
 
 
Here are the results from the second spider chart (your own priorities setting and the average). 4 
related questions follow below. 
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Question 5 
Note how the proposals in the average spider chart are relatively evenly spread, apart from 
genetically engineered crops and chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which we therefore discard. 
However, it is still hard to choose the number of priorities. Regarding political (donor-side and 
recipient-side) and economic realities (donor-side), how many priorities would be your suggestion 
and why? 
Answer: 
   
 
Question 6 
Your own priorities setting differs somewhat from the average one. Are there any results in the 
average spider chart that you object to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general 
or due to your specific geographical or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way). 
Answer: 
  
   
Question 7 
Having seen the average spider chart and chosen the number of priorities, would you rank these 
priorities in 
–   the same way as in the average spider chart, 
–   in the same way as you ranked them originally (if you gave suggestions the same rank, please  
     try to rank these as well), 
–   or in some other way (if so, please elaborate)? 
Answer: 
  
   
Question 8 
Of your now chosen priorities for climate finance if some of it was to go to local-scale projects for 
small-scale farmers facing potential land grabbing due to climate change, are there any aspects that 
are more important than others, that are missing, or that should be left out? 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Here are the results from the scales (your own choices and the average choices). 3 related questions 
follow below. 
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Question 9 
Your own choices differ somewhat from the average ones. Is there any average choice that you object 
to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general or due to your specific geographical 
or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way). 
Answer: 
  
Question 10 
Is there anything that you would like to nuance about the three choices on how climate finance 
should be prioritized if some of it would promote overriding farming practices and food security 
strategies for small-scale farmers facing potential land grabbing due to climate change? 
Answer: 
  
  
Question 11 
How would you rank the importance of the three choices if you had to? 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Question 12 
Is there anything else you would like to share regarding my research? It could be anything and 
criticism is highly welcomed. 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING 
AND SORRY FOR TAKING UP SO MUCH OF YOUR TIME
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Half-structured, half semi-structured 
 
APPENDIX 3. Interview guide 
Interviews will be audio recorded unless interviewee wishes them not to be. 
Estimated time requirement: 30 minutes.  
 
INTRODUCTION (can be broadened or narrowed depending on situation): 
 
It can be argued that climate change will make land grabbing – large purchases or leases of 
agricultural land by private companies or foreign or domestic governments – more common 
because of increased biofuel production and decreased agricultural productivity in countries who 
can afford to make land acquisitions. Some commentators consider land grabbing to be beneficial 
for the host country as much-needed agricultural investment. Others see the risk of local 
communities and small-scale farmers not being considered in the deals and therefore becoming 
doubly adversely affected by climate change when they also face growing incentives to sell land 
with declining productivity. Forced displacement of people when land rights are not codified or 
respected is another often-seen consequence of land grabbing. 
 This interview is part of an undergraduate-level thesis aiming to identify what priorities relevant 
non-governmental organizations would like climate adaptation aid to have if it is to be used to 
prevent land grabbing that negatively affects small-scale farmers (this is a controversial issue but 
seeing as how climate change is ever looking worse, I argue that climate adaptation aid should both 
be enlarged and that is should take land-grabbing issues into consideration). The portion of climate 
aid that would go to this issue is unspecified in the thesis. The voices of NGOs are wanted because 
they are, in the scope of this thesis, considered as representatives for the climate-vulnerable small-
scale farmers. The aim of this interview is to be a part of a group of interviews and a questionnaire 
survey that together will identify preliminary priorities, which will then be zoomed in upon for further 
qualitative analysis. 
 
TECHNICALITIES: 
 
1. Do you wish to remain anonymous or may I publish your name, and possibly some professional 
details about you, together with possible quotes and with the interview appendix (all interview 
transcripts will not be appended to the thesis)? This would lend the thesis extra credibility. 
 
2. If agreeable, would you please share the name of your organization? 
 
3. On what topics does your organization work? Are land grabbing issues something you give a lot 
of attention? 
 
WARM UP: 
 
1. Do you think land grabbing will become more common as a result of climate change? 
 
2. If so, do you believe this to be a large threat to climate-vulnerable people, in relation to other 
climate threats, or can it be properly managed so as to be of net gain to small-scale farmers? 
 
TURNING TO CLIMATE AID AND LAND GRABBING : 
 
– Giving climate adaptation aid in order to prevent land grabbing from small-scale farmers, or at 
least to prevent its worst consequences for small-scale farmers, is poised to be a controversial 
issue. Seeing as how powerhouses such as China, Saudi Arabia, and multinational companies 
have a lot at stake, talks about using climate finance to impede land deals will probably be 
welcomed with anxiety and strong blowback. The Green Climate Fund therefore will hardly become 
the chosen platform for this kind of climate aid. Perhaps national donors could do important work of 
this kind on their own, however. Would all of this be an accurate statement, in your opinion? 
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– Which goal do you think would be most fruitful to pursue for climate adaptation aid: the altogether 
prevention of land grabbing from small-scale farmers or the prevention of the worst consequences 
of such land grabs for the farmers? 
 
– My thesis is looking mainly on land grabbing directly from small-scale farmers and not as much 
on deals on uncultivated land (which often is not entirely unused). In the latter case, fighting 
corruption in government and promoting good governance might be slightly more important for 
climate adaptation aid to address than in the former case, while the opposite relationship rings true 
for local-scale adaptation measures and work to ensure that small-scale farmers and local 
communities are consulted in the processes leading up to land deals; these take on a bigger 
importance when land already being cultivated by small-scale farmers is grabbed. I have not said 
anything about any approach being more important than another – but will you? Can we say 
something general about which approach is more important? 
 
– An international code of conduct, or a set of guidelines, ensuring the rights of small-scale farmers 
and that they will benefit from land deals through adequate compensation or by enjoying new job 
opportunities would be a welcome first step. The G8 has adopted guidelines for international land 
investments, but is has been criticized for being too weak and for not consulting recipient countries 
when they were set up, and in the UN’s Committee on World Food Security, governance of land 
tenure has been subjected to guidelines (mainly for governments) with a rights-based approach, 
including a gender focus. The guidelines have been endorsed by over 100 of the Committee’s 
member countries. This is a significant development, but since compliance is voluntary, it is 
hampered. Free, prior, and informed consent of non-indigenous poor communities is also not 
required. Codes of conduct and guidelines largely fall outside of climate adaptation aid as we 
usually picture it, but do you think such finance could go towards helping small-scale farmers lobby 
for their sake and put pressure on their governments – and other actors on the international arena – 
to put more consideration into their plights? Or is such an approach doomed? 
 
WALKTHROUGH OF QUESTIONNAIRE: 
 
Everything in the questionnaire, except the first question, is discussed in an open fashion together 
with the interviewee, who gives his or her view on the topics at hand. The same order of the spider 
charts, the striking of preferred balances between the farming practice dichotomies, and the 
question on practical realization, will be attempted but cannot be guaranteed for obvious reasons. 
In addition to providing insights and identifying priorities, the aim for the walkthrough is to both 
provide a visual help for structuring of thought and inspiration, and to make interviews a bit more 
compatible with the questionnaire respondents’ answers. At the same time, free thought is valuable 
for the thesis and seeing as how the interviewee already is committed to the interview and hence 
will not be as deterred by an open question prior to receiving named visual help, he or she will be 
asked the below question before the walkthrough begins.  
 
If we suppose climate adaptation aid will be disbursed to address issues 
 of land grabbing implications on small-scale farmers in developing countries,  
which three or four top priorities would you set for it? 
 
 
ROUND OFF: 
 
1. When all interviews and questionnaires have been analyzed and COP 18 is over I might like to 
conduct short follow-up interviews over e-mail or Skype. Would you consider taking part? 
 
2. If yes, or if you would like to have the final thesis sent to you: what is your e-mail address? 
  
Thank you very much for participating! 
 
